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Oil: The Doom of Com mu nist Ro ma nia?*
ANDREI MIROIU
The pur pose of this pa per is two fold: first, to es tab lish the ex is tence of a cer-
tain pat tern of analy sis, which I will call an aca demic canon, of ana lyz ing the prob-
lems caused by the oil cri ses of the 1970’s on the econ omy of Com mu nist Ro ma nia. 
The canon seems to hold that a se ries of eco nomic de ci sions taken in the 1960’s 
and 70’s by the com mu nist lead er ship con cern ing the vast ex pan sion of the pe tro-
leum in dus try led to huge prob lems af ter the enor mous in creases in the price of oil 
at the end of the 1970’s, which led to the vir tual de struc tion of the econ omy and 
the huge dep ri va tions of the 1980’s, thus help ing to ex plain the popu lar re jec tion 
of the so cial ist re gime. The sec ond goal is to ana lyze what the Ro ma nian com mu-
nist lead er ship thought of the oil in dus try and what was their gen eral strat egy re-
lated to it. If the first part of the ar ti cle deals gen er ally with sec on dary sources, in 
the last part I use a sig nifi cant amount of pri mary sources, mainly speeches given 
by the party lead ers in or der to pur sue my re search. All the speeches I use were 
pub lic, most of them broad casted on ra dio and tele vi sion, printed in mass cir cu la-
tion news pa pers and af ter wards bound to gether in vol umes of docu ments. The pa-
per is struc tured in four sec tions. The first of fers a brief his tori cal in tro duc tion to 
the is sue, fo cus ing on oil as one of the three main com modi ties that ever put Ro ma-
nia or the Ro ma nian prin ci pali ties on the eco nomic map of the world. The sec ond 
sec tion deals ex ten sively with the de vel op ment of the aca demic canon and with 
the main au thors con cerned with it. The third part is dedi cated to the analy sis of 
pri mary sources, while in the con clu sions I link the main parts of the pa per and 
sug gest di rec tions for pos si ble fur ther re search.
A Short Ex plana tory In tro duc tion
The econo mies of small states are of ten, at least from a his tori cal for eign trade 
per spec tive en com pass ing the mod ern world eco nomic sys tem, de pend ent of a 
par ticu lar prod uct or com mod ity. Sel dom can one find a case such as Swit zer land, 
which for cen tu ries ex ported men, clocks, choco late, and bank ing ser vices. Usu-
ally we en coun ter cases when a small coun try pro duces for the for eign mar kets 
just ba nanas, rub ber, T-shirts, or I-pods. Ro ma nia and be fore it came into ex is tence 
the Ro ma nian prin ci pali ties were, if we would take a longer per spec tive, per haps 
of Braude lian in spi ra tion, a lit tle bit more in ter est ing1. From a his tori cal point of 
view at least three com modi ties – cat tle, grain and oil – domi nated the for eign 
* This paper was first presented to the Romanian Studies Organization`s Second Conference, 
Indiana University, Bloomington, 28 February 2009. The author would like to thank Maria Bucur 
and Justin Classen for their help and suggestions in writing this article.
1 Fernand BRAUDEL, ”Histoire et science sociale: La longue durée”, Annales. Économies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations, vol. 13, no. 4, 1958, pp. 725-753.
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trade and in ter nal eco nomic struc ture of Ro ma nia, and, be fore it came into be ing, 
that of the Ro ma nian prin ci pali ties.
Proba bly the first thing that placed the Ro ma nian voievo dates on the eco nomic 
map of Europe, from the 15th to the 18th cen tu ries, was cat tle. Vast ex ports of cat tle, 
in herds num ber ing per haps thou sands of heads moved from Mol da via and Wal-
la chia through south ern Po land to Dan zig and from the Bal tic Sea port to the mar-
kets of the Ger man prin ci pali ties, the Low Coun tries and Eng land; other routes 
took them to Her mann stadt and from there to the south ern Habs burg lands1.
Grain was the sec ond com mod ity vastly ex ported by the Ro ma nian prin ci pali-
ties, mainly into the Ot to man Em pire for many cen tu ries be cause of the com mer-
cial mo nop oly the lat ter en joyed in re la tion to them since the sub jec tion of those 
prin ci pali ties in the 15th cen tury. Af ter 1829 this mo nop oly ceased be cause the 
Russo-Turk ish peace treaty and vast de mand of grain from West ern mar kets, es pe-
cially Brit ish led not only to lar ger ex ports, but in deed to a to tal shift of the in ter-
nal agrar ian econ omy to wards an in ten sive pro duc tion of grain, deeply al ter ing 
la bor and prop erty re la tions. Ac cord ing to cer tain au thors this led to the ef fec tive 
colo ni za tion of the prin ci pali ties (and Ro ma nia it self af ter the un ion of 1859), their 
trans for ma tion in a pe riph ery of the Brit ish in dus trial econ omy2; other schol ars, of 
lo cal ex trac tion, saw this as the mo ment when the lo cal bour geoi sie started its 
quest for power and for a trans for ma tive role in the Ro ma nian state3 .
Then the econo mies of the West ern world ac cel er ated their path to wards in-
dus tri ali za tion; tech no logi cal changes and en ergy needs led to new uses for a very 
old sub stance, of which Ro ma nia hap pened to pos sess an abun dance: oil. Lo cal in-
dus tri al ists started the ex ploi ta tion of the re source as soon as Penn syl vania’s oil 
drill ers, namely in the late 1850s, us ing roughly the same meth ods, but also bene-
fit ting from the faster de vel op ment of drill ing tech niques in neighbor ing Pol ish 
Galicia4. Yet mass ex ploi ta tion of the two main oil fields in the Pra hova re gion and 
at Băr căneşti in Mol da via started just at the dawn of the 20th cen tury, af ter mas sive 
in vest ments by Ameri can and Brit ish capi tal. The in dus try was so im por tant that, 
when it be came ob vi ous that the Ro ma nian army could not de fend the oil fields 
while fac ing a joint Aus trian-Ger man-Bul gar ian in va sion in the au tumn of 1916, 
the Brit ish in tel li gence dis patched Colo nel John Nor ton-Grif fiths to or gan ize the 
Ro ma nian-gov ern ment led ef fec tive de struc tion of the ex trac tion and re fin ery ca-
paci ties of the Pra hova fa cili ties5. In the inter war pe riod, the oil in dus try grew 
1 Marian MALOWIST, ”The Trade of Eastern Europe in the Later Middle Ages”, in 
M.M. POSTAN, Edward MILLER (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. II, Trade 
and Industry in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 556. The author 
also points to the integration of the Moldovan cattle-based economy into a regional one, 
comprising also Podolia (contemporary western Ukraine).
2 Daniel CHIROT, Social Change in a Peripheral Society. The Creation of a Balkan Colony, Academic 
Press, New York, 1976.
3 See for that Ştefan ZELETIN, Burghezia română: originea şi rolul ei istoric, Ed. Humanitas, 
Bucu reşti, 1991 and IDEM, Neoliberalismul: studii asupra istoriei şi politicii burgheziei române, 
Ed. Scripta, Bucureşti, 1992 and Mihail MANOILESCU, Rostul şi destinul burgheziei româneşti, 
Ed. Albatros, Bucureşti, 2002.
4 See for the beginning of oil drillings and struggles in Pennsylvania the classic work of 
Daniel YERGIN, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1991, ch. 1.
5 Ibidem, pp. 180-182. However, Romanian oil was also extremely important for the Central 
Powers, who poured enough capital and work, that they restored 80% of the 1914 pro duction 
by 1918.
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even more, in sig nifi cantly de terred by the ef fects of the Great De pres sion; in World 
War II the sig nifi cance of the Ro ma nian oil fields for the Ger man war ma chine was 
so great, that it com pletely molded the po liti cal re la tions be tween the two al lies, 
and pro voked the most spec tacu lar Ameri can bomb ing op era tion to date, Op era-
tion Tidal Wave on Au gust 1st, 19431.
By the time the So viet Army con quered Ro ma nia in the late sum mer and fall 
of 1944, the oil in dus try had domi nated for eign trade for dec ades. Af ter a com mu-
nist gov ern ment came to power and the crea tion of a new econ omy based on the 
So viet model be gan, vastly ori ented to wards build ing a mod ern and in dus trial so-
ci ety, it be came ob vi ous that the oil in dus try would be come one of the most sig-
nifi cant aces in the hand of the new power elite. The topic of this pa per is deeply 
re lated to what the Ro ma nian com mu nist lead ers thought of the pe tro leum in dus-
try, its uses and prob lem atic The most im por tant fac tor that peaked my in ter est 
while re search ing this pa per was the com monly held be lief that per me ated aca-
demic cir cles, es pe cially West ern, that spe cific de ci sions con cern ing the oil in dus-
try led to the grave prob lems that the Ro ma nian econ omy faced af ter 1979, which 
led to a vast and cruel aus ter ity pro gram that in curred the wrath of the popu la tion, 
thus lead ing to a pos si ble ex pla na tion for the popu la tion’s par tici pa tion in or at 
least the ac cep tance of the popu lar riot of De cem ber 1989, a sig nifi cant part of the 
events that led to the fall of the Ro ma nian com mu nist re gime. An aca demic canon 
was formed on the mat ter, and it sounds pretty much like this: in the 1960’s and early 
1970’s the Ro ma nian com mu nist gov ern ment gam bled with the eco nomic fu ture 
of the coun try by de cid ing to vastly ex pand the oil-re fin ing ca paci ties and the 
chemi cal in dus try in or der to sell pe tro leum-de riva tives on the world mar ket for 
much-cov eted West ern cur rency that could be used for ac quir ing newer tech nolo-
gies. The bet went sour in the con text of de clin ing in ter nal oil pro duc tion and es pe-
cially be cause of the oil cri ses of 1973-79, which led to a growth of oil im ports, huge 
trade defi cits and in the end a need to re sched ule for eign debt, which in turn led to 
the aw ful de ci sion to pay the for eign debt by im pos ing a harsh aus ter ity pro gram. 
My pur pose is not so much to chal lenge or ar gue in fa vor of this ar gu ment, but 
rather to see if this po si tion can be sus tained by ana lyz ing a dif fer ent type of evi-
dence, namely the Ro ma nian Com mu nist Party`s po liti cal and eco nomic docu ments 
re lated to the broader per spec tive of the Ro ma nian eco nomic de vel op ment. I will 
ana lyze a spe cific se lec tion of first-hand docu ments to see if the Ro ma nian Com-
mu nist Party’s oil pol icy was in deed a gam ble; if oil in dus try ex pan sion was a 
goal onto it self in the po liti cal-eco nomic think ing of the Party lead ers; and if the 
Ro ma nian lead ers were so un aware that their de ci sions may gen er ate so much 
trou ble and in deed lead to their de mise. Look ing through their lenses is, from my 
point of view, a more in ter est ing ap proach than just ana lyz ing dif fer ent ta bles and 
par ticu lar poli cies. These speeches, be ing very large and gen er ally ad dress ing sub-
jects re lated to the so ci ety and the econ omy as a whole have a bet ter chance to put 
the en tire oil dis cus sion in a wider, more rele vant frame work. My main hy pothe sis 
is that, at least ac cord ing to their plan ning, pe tro leum-de riva tives in dus try was just 
one of many ar eas of the so cial ist econ omy, rather than some thing on which the 
Ro ma nian com mu nist lead er ship would bet the eco nomic fu ture of the coun try, 
1 A good depiction of the connection between oil politics and military cooperation between 
the two allies is provided by Larry WATTS, Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance 
Behavior in Wartime, Umea University, Umea, 1998.
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much less their po liti cal sur vival. First, how ever, I turn to the ac cepted aca demic 
canon and its in ter est ing, if ques tion able, ar gu ments.
The Aca demic Canon
A con certed view of what was go ing on with the Ro ma nian econ omy be cause 
of the in vest ment blun ders and the oil shocks is for mu lated quite early af ter the 
first prob lems ap peared. Ac cord ing to my re search, in the mid dle-to-lat ter part of 
the 1980s the story took full shape and the two dec ades that fol lowed the fall of 
com mu nism merely per petu ated the schol arly nar ra tive. One of the first things 
that needs to be men tioned here is that the main crea tors of the canon were not pro-
fes sional his to ri ans, but econo mists, such as Marvin Jack son or Wil liam Crow ther, 
eco nomic ge og ra phers like David Tur nock, so ci olo gists such as Mi chael Shafir or 
in ter na tional se cu rity schol ars like Daniel Nel son. Only af ter the 1989 Revo lu tion 
the his to ri ans take cen ter stage in re it er at ing the canon as the domi nant dis course 
re lated to the eco nomic prob lems of the late pe riod of Ro ma nian com mu nism. 
Among the first to no tice the prob lems con nected to the oil cri ses was Marvin Jack-
son, and he soon be came the most im por tant source of all the other aca dem ics 
who worked on this par ticu lar is sue. Al ready in 1981 he no ticed that the main 
prob lem of the Ro ma nian econ omy was that in vest ments in pe tro leum, which 
took very large shares of to tal in dus trial in vest ments, re sulted in lit tle growth of 
capi tal stock. Hit by a cri sis in the price of oil and pe tro leum-based prod ucts, Ro-
ma nia was bound to suf fer1. Just a few years later, Wal ter Ba con, a his to rian of in-
ter na tional re la tions also no ticed that the pe tro leum cri sis was a fac tor af fect ing not 
just the econ omy, but also the for eign re la tions. He saw that the over tures made 
by Nico lae Ceauşescu to wards low-de vel op ment coun tries (LDC), es pe cially in the 
Mid dle East, were deeply con nected to the prob lems with the oil sup ply2. But 
proba bly the best por trayal of the canon be longs to Mi chael Shafir, writ ten in 1985. 
Shafir no ticed that from 1973 to 1978 the oil re fin ing ca pac ity in creased from 
18.5 to 25.4 mil lion tons; up to 1975 the coun try was a net oil ex porter, but af ter 
1976 it be comes a hun gry pe tro leum im porter3.
A few fig ures are im por tant in this frame work and he duly pro vides them: 
the pro duc tion of Ro ma nian crude oil fol lows the fol low ing trend – 1975 14.6 mil-
lion tons, 1976 14.7, 1977 14.7, 1978 13.7, 1979 12.3, 1980 11.5, 1981 11.6, 1982 11.7, 
1983 11.6 – as we see, very re spect able fig ures if one doesn’t take into ac count the 
par al lel in crease in re fin ing ca pac ity. The trend of im ports has a far steeper slope: 
1975 5 mil lion tons of crude oil, 1976 8.4, 1977 8.8, 1978 12.9, 1979 14.2, 1980 15.9, 
1981 12.9. It is at this point where Shafir also in tro duces the is sue of re la tions with 
the LDCs: due to poor re la tions with the So viet Un ion at the be gin ning of the 
1970s, Ro ma nia was forced to rely more and more on the pe tro leum im ports from 
1 Marvin R. JACKSON, ”Perspective on Romania’s Economic Development in the 1980’s”, 
in Daniel N. NELSON (ed.), Romania in the 1980’s, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, 
p. 267.
2 Walter M. BACON, ”Romania”, in Teresa RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE (ed.), Communism 
in Eastern Europe, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, pp. 175-176.
3 Michael SHAFIR, Romania. Politics, Economics and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated 
Change, Lynne Rienne Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 110.
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those coun tries1. He no tices that by 1980 77% of trade with Ro ma nia’s pe tro leum 
sup pli ers (in clud ing So viet Un ion and China) was rep re sented by im ports and, in 
1981 – 80% of pe tro leum im ports came from de vel op ing ”friendly Arab coun-
tries”2. Shafir is among the first to in sist on the idea that, al though the cri sis might 
have had some posi tive as pects for the coun try, be cause it would lead to a bet ter 
bal ance of trade with the Euro pean Eco nomic Com mu nity, the most nega tive as-
pects stem from the gov ern ment’s re ac tion to the cri sis: im pose dep ri va tions on 
the popu la tion in or der to pay the debts and to har ness more re sources in the eco-
nomic growth pro gram3.
In 1986, Olga Narkiewicz in tro duces an other im por tant ele ment of the aca-
demic canon when ana lyz ing the eco nomic cri sis of Ro ma nian com mu nism. 
While she no tices some im por tant po liti cal prob lems which ag gra vated the coun-
try’s cir cum stances, like the con cen tra tion of power in the hands of just one fam-
ily – a proc ess that led to the di min ish ing im por tance of the party struc tures and 
sub se quently to the con cen tra tion of de ci sions con cern ing the oil pol icy in a very 
small cir cle – she also points out that the econ omy skips the ef fects of the 1973 
pe tro leum cri sis, but is hardly hit in stead by the1979 in crease in oil prices. In an 
econ omy based on ”im port-led” growth since 1967, the in crease in the price of oil 
couldn’t have any thing else but bad ef fects4. The idea that the 1979 cri sis was in-
deed the most im por tant mo ment that led to a gen eral cri sis of the Ro ma nian 
econ omy is re in forced by John Pearce Hardt and Carl H. McMillan who ar gue 
that the sec ond oil shock pre cipi tated a bal ance of pay ments cri sis which forced 
Ro ma nia to re sched ule its ex ter nal debt, which in turn led to the aus ter ity pro-
gram of the 1980’s5. One should proba bly note a very im por tant thing here. Most 
of those au thors, es pe cially those writ ing in the early and mid-1980’s were some-
how con strained in their analy sis by liv ing in the midst of the events. It is there-
fore eas ier to see why their per spec tive is lim ited: events were just un fold ing plus 
the in for ma tion com ing from Ro ma nia it self was ei ther scarce, ei ther un trust-
worthy. In 1988, Daniel Nel son made im por tant con tri bu tions to the propa ga tion 
of the nar ra tive. Ac cord ing to him, the causes of the se vere aus ter ity con di tions 
that char ac ter ize the Ro ma nian eco nomic life in the 1980s are to be found in the 
ex ten sive growth strat egy. The loans from the West to build ex ces sive ca pac ity (re-
lated to Ro ma nia`s own ca pac ity to use them) in such heavy in dus tries such as 
pet ro chemi cal and steel plants in Piteşti, Hun e do ara, and Galaţi meant that the 
strat egy back fired when Ro ma nia was forced to re sched ule its pay ments af ter the 
sec ond oil shock6. Nel son, who is fun da men tally in ter ested in the hard se cu rity 
as pects of poli tics, such as the com po si tion and train ing of the mili tary, also notes 
that the sec ond oil shock was also mak ing its im pact in the con tinu ous de cline of 
mili tary budg ets and pre par ed ness (es pe cially mo bil ity) af ter 19797.
1 Ibidem, p. 111.
2 Ibidem, p. 115.
3 Ibidem, pp. 113-114.
4 Olga A. NARKIEWICZ, Eastern Europe 1968-1984, Routledge, London, 1986, p. 74.
5 John Pearce HARDT, Carl H. McMILLAN (eds.), Planned Economies: Confronting the Challenges 
of the 1980s, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 3.
6 Daniel N. NELSON, Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era, Gordon and Breach Science 
Publishers, New York, 1988, pp. xiii-xiv.
7 Ibidem, p. 185.
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This canon is an in te gral part of the solid book by Wil liam Crow ther pub lished 
in 19881. The au thor writes in a con sciously-as sumed anti-Waller steinian per spec-
tive (thus di rected against the frame work Daniel Chi rot worked in the same time), 
stress ing the fact that Ro ma nia’s role in the world econ omy is largely a prod uct of 
in ter nal eco nomic cir cum stances, not of its pre sumed role in a pe riph ery of the 
world-sys tem. Ac cord ing to Crow ther, the ne ces sity of ob tain ing oil was the most 
press ing prob lem in the Ceauşescu era. Oil pro duc tion grew just 1.6% an nu ally 
from 1966 to 1973, while the am bi tious ex pan sion of Ro ma nia’s pe tro leum in dus-
try due to the need to ac quire more cur rency through the ex port of re fined prod-
ucts in creased de mand at a much greater rate, in a con text in which it was dif fi cult 
to get oil at pro mo tional prices from the So viet Un ion due to the prob lems with the 
Coun cil of Mu tual Eco nomic Aid (CMEA)2. The be gin ning of the in ter na tional oil 
cri sis in 1974 not only in creased the cost of im ports, but also shrinked the mar ket 
for the ex port of Ro ma nian re fined-pe tro leum prod ucts, turn ing what had been a 
sub stan tial trade sur plus into a huge defi cit prac ti cally over night. As pe tro leum im-
ports rose from 10 000 bar rels/day in 1976 to 16 000 bar rels/day in 1980 and in the 
con text of slug gish prices for re fined prod ucts, by 1980 Ro ma nia was los ing as 
much as $900 000 per day on its ex ports of re fined pe tro leum prod ucts, thus lead-
ing the to tal debt to 10.35 bil lion dol lars in 1981. This hap pened while at the same 
time Ro ma nia was des per ately try ing to boost links with the LDCs in or der to buy 
oil from them, the com merce with these coun tries jump ing from 7% of to tal trade 
to 25% in 1980. Ac cord ing to Crow ther, those links were main tained ei ther through 
po liti cal-sym bolic steps, such as the rec og ni tion of the Pal es tine Lib era tion Or gani-
za tion, which was also given a quasi-of fi cial em bassy in Bu cha rest, or through 
arms trade. The au thor es ti mates that weap ons worth 2 bil lion dol lars were ex-
ported by Ro ma nia to the LDC`s from 1978 to 1982 and that dur ing the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-1988) Ro ma nia sold weap ons worth 825 mil lion dol lars to Iraq in ex-
change for crude oil3. All of these oc cur ences and cri ses led to the aus ter ity poli cies 
that marked the 1980’s in Ro ma nia and were bound to lead to greater prob lems.
Even Mary Ellen Fischer, who pro vided a sub stan tive, if some how un der re-
searched4 bi og ra phy of Nico lae Ceauşescu and was there fore bent on ex plain ing cri-
ses and poli cies largely by psy cho logi cal means, was ad mit ting in 1989 that the 
eco nomic and so cial fail ures of the 1980’s are pri mar ily the re spon si bil ity of 
Ceauşescu’s own strengths and weak nesses and also changes in the bal ance of 
trade in pe tro leum and pe tro leum prod ucts af ter the oil cri ses5. Fischer of fers a full, 
late-1980s ver sion of the canon, worth re tell ing for the pur poses of this pa per, in 
the sense that it is the most com plete ver sion of it be fore the fall of com mu nism in 
Ro ma nia. Ac cord ing to her, the causes for the eco nomic dif fi cul ties af ter 1979 are 
deeper, the ini tial sign of cri sis be ing the short age of hard cur rency re sult ing ap par-
ently from struc tural im bal ances in the in ter na tional pe tro leum mar ket. Ro ma nia, 
1 William E. CROWTHER, The Political Economy of Romanian Socialism, Praeger, New York, 
1988.
2 Ibidem, pp. 131-134.
3 Ibidem, pp. 138-142.
4 Fischer hardly pays any attention to the period spent by Ceauşescu as a major-general 
commanding the Superior Political Directorate of the Army in the early 1950`s and to his alleged 
studies in the Soviet Union, at the prestigious ”Frunze” Military Academy.
5 Mary Ellen FISCHER, Nicolae Ceauşescu. A Study in Political Leadership, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder & London, 1989, p. 3.
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who had a long-term spe ciali za tion in pe tro leum-re lated prod ucts, con tin ued to 
de velop ma jor re fin ing ca pac ity through out the com mu nist era, but es pe cially in 
the 1960’s and 70’s. In con trast to Shafir, Fischer points out to a surge in pe tro leum 
im ports (when com pared with pro duc tion) since the late 1960’s and no tices that the 
coun try didn’t ex peri ence ini tial prob lems with the 1973-74 cri sis be cause the price 
of Ro ma nian ex ports – re fined pe tro leum prod ucts also grew. How ever, af ter the 
sec ond oil shock the prices for re fined prod ucts didn’t grow as fast as the price of 
oil it self and thus the prob lems of the econ omy be came truly grave1. The prob lems 
be came even more dif fi cult af ter the Shah’s fall from power and the be gin ning of 
the Iran-Iraq war, be cause these de vel op ments hin dered ac cess to the most im por-
tant sources of cheaper oil; the Ro ma nian lead er ship was thus forced to im port pe-
tro leum from the So viet Un ion in the early 1980’s, which it could only do at the 
mar ket prices, due to the po liti cal prob lems caused by ear lier ”dis si dence” – namely 
Ro ma nia’s pre sumed dis tanc ing from the eco nomic poli cies of the CMAE and the 
for eign poli cies stances of the War saw Treaty Or gani za tion since the mid 1960’s. 
Ac cord ing to Fischer two cru cial eco nomic de ci sions of the 60’s and 70’s – namely 
to in vest heav ily in pe tro leum and petro-chemi cal prod ucts and to mini mize the 
co op era tion in Come con in creased the de pend ency on hard cur rency im ports of 
tech nol ogy and raw ma te ri als, thus forc ing the econ omy ei ther in a spi ral of ac-
quir ing more and more hard-cur rency or on a path to wards au tarky. Af ter the 
1981 Pol ish cri sis that cre ates a sig nifi cant cri sis of con fi dence for West ern bank ers, 
mak ing lend ing far more dif fi cult and forc ing So viet block coun tries to re sched ule 
the pay ments for the ex ter nal debt, the Ro ma nian lead er ship de cided to try harder 
on the au tarky strat egy of de vel op ment2.
It is in ter est ing to see how the canon is main tained, if not de vel oped af ter the 
fall of com mu nism. One might think that more ac cess to sources, peo ple in im por-
tant de ci sion-mak ing po si tions, com para tive ap proaches might change some of 
the can non. In deed, this was not the case. The canon stands pretty much the same 
as it was for mu lated in the mid-to-late 1980’s. In 1993 Gale Stokes pro vided a dis-
cus sion of the Ro ma nian pe tro leum in dus try as a source of the coun try’s eco nomic 
trou bles in the 1980’s; Ro ma nian had the larg est oil fields in East ern Europe ex cept 
those of the So viet Un ion and thus had the ba sis for a strong oil in dus try through-
out the cen tury. He makes the con nec tion be tween the huge ex ter nal debt – 10.3 bil-
lion dol lars3 by 1981 and oil im ports from the lesser de vel oped coun tries, al most all 
of them ruled by dic ta tors well con nected with Ceauşescu (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Al ge-
ria), and points to the link be tween the dis as trous de ci sion to pay the debt and the 
in ter nal dep ri va tions which led to the con vul sions of 19894. In his 1995 book Den-
nis De le tant clings to the same story of the link be tween oil im ports, in crease in oil 
prices, huge ex ter nal debt that Ceauşescu de cided to pay while lead ing the coun try 
on an au tarky path and its ne fari ous con se quences in the daily lives of Ro ma ni ans5. 
1 Ibidem, p. 249.
2 Ibidem, p. 250.
3 Why is this particular figure huge from a political point of view? Romania had a population 
of 21-22 million in the early 1980’s and the GDP per capita was around 2000$. Thus, the external 
debt, all in hard currency, was about 25% of the GDP.
4 Gale STOKES, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 58.
5 Dennis DELETANT, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989, 
M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1995, p. 322.
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It is even more in ter est ing to see that the canon is the same in mono graphs dedi-
cated to East ern Europe in gen eral and to the books that ad dress Ro ma nia in par-
ticu lar. R.J. Cramp ton re tells in a book dedi cated to the his tory of the re gion in the 
20th cen tury the story of how the eco nomic strat egy of the 1970’s went wrong (to 
bor row from the West to build re fin ery ca pac ity for Arab crude oil, but to face de-
clin ing in ter nal oil pro duc tion and be forced to rely on ex pen sive pe tro leum im-
ports while the prices for re fined pe tro leum prod ucts don’t rise fast enough). Ac-
cord ing to him, when a coun try like Ro ma nia is trapped be tween the an vil of the 
world mar ket and the ham mer of Ceauşescu’s ego, the trou bles were to be ex-
pected, were even un avoid able1. In the same time, in a book dedi cated to the last 
few dec ades of Ro ma nian his tory, Ste ven Roper links eco nomic losses due to in-
crease of pe tro leum prices in the 1970’s to debt, debt re pay ment poli cies and aus-
ter ity, and thus per petu ates the same dis course2. In one of the more re cent 
treat ments of the prob lem a well known spe cial ist of Ro ma nian eco nomic ge og ra-
phy, David Tur nock falls prey to the same canon, re lin quish ing his usual bal anced 
views for a cri tique of the gi gan tism of ex ces sive ca paci ties for oil re fin ing and 
treat ing the oil prob lems of the time un der the ti tle ”Pol icy Ab er ra tions of the 
1980`s: The Cli max of Sul tan ism”3.
There are,how ever, works that ei ther pro vide a far lar ger eco nomic and so cial 
frame work for un der stand ing the prob lems of Ro ma nian com mu nism, or fo cus en-
tirely on po liti cal and even per sonal in tri ca cies, oc clud ing the fact that Ro ma nia 
was a coun try of over 20 mil lion in habi tants, not just the ”Pri măverii” neighbor-
hood in north ern Bu cha rest4. Among the first group of stud ies, one can cite es pe-
cially left-wing so ci olo gists and po liti cal sci en tists such as Sil viu Bru can or Vladi mir 
Pasti5. They ac knowl edge the im pact of the oil cri ses on the Ro ma nian econ omy, 
but they fo cus more ei ther on the gen eral cri sis of the com mu nist bloc or on the re-
la tions of power be tween the lay ers of lead er ship in the Ro ma nian so ci ety. Among 
the sec ond group one finds im por tant schol ars like Vladi mir Tis măne anu or Ste-
lian Tănase, who tend to de scribe the re ali ties of the Ro ma nian com mu nist pe riod 
in the frame work of per son ali ties’ strug gles for ac quir ing and main tain ing power 
po si tions, and thus pay ing far less at ten tion to eco nomic or so cie tal as pects6.
I pro vided a length ier ac count of the aca demic canon that re lates in vest ments 
in the pe tro leum in dus try and the oil cri ses of the 1970’s with the eco nomic and so-
cial trou bles in the 1980’s Ro ma nia in or der to see how old, per sua sive, and per va-
sive this way of rea son ing truly is. I turn next to ex am in ing how the Ro ma nian 
1 R.J. CRAMPTON, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After, Routledge, London, 
1997, p. 385.
2 Steven D. ROPER, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, Routledge, London, 2000, 
pp. 55-56.
3 David TURNOCK, Aspects of Independent Romania’s Economic History with Particular 
Reference to Transition for EU Accession, Ashgate, London, 2007, p. 33.
4 The ”Primăverii” neighborhood was the preferred place of living for the Romanian 
nomenklatura. 
5 Silviu BRUCAN, Pluralism and Social Conflict: A Social Analysis of the Communist World, 
Praeger, New York, 1990 and Vladimir PASTI, The Challenges of Transition. Romania in Transition, 
East European Monographs, Boulder, Colorado, 1997.
6 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of Romanian 
Communism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003 and Stelian TĂNASE, Elite şi societate: 
guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998.
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po liti cal lead er ship viewed the role of the oil in dus try in the lar ger frame work of 
the Ro ma nian econ omy. My main pur pose is not so much to chal lenge the aca-
demic canon, but to pro vide nu ance to it. The main au thors who elabo rated the 
canon were po liti cal sci en tists and econo mists usu ally work ing with sta tis tics; they 
usu ally avoided dis cuss ing the prob lems in terms of the of fi cial party view re gard-
ing Ro ma nia’s de vel op ment strat egy. One of the most im por tant prob lems of this 
type of re search is how to avoid scrap pa per, wooden-tongue and worth less lit era-
ture1; there fore, my per sonal op tion was to re search first and fore most the most im-
por tant speeches that the lead ers of the party were giv ing in para mount oc ca sions 
such as Party Con gresses or Party Na tional Con fer ences. Why these speechesand 
not laws, budg ets or other type of docu ments, doubt lessly use ful for a com plete re-
search of the mat ter? Be cause these are the kind of speeches that give the broader 
per spec tives, which can give us a true meas ure of what the Ro ma nian com mu nist 
lead er ship as signed to a par ticu lar sec tor of econ omy and so ci ety, and of the re la-
tions be tween these sec tors. The speeches to these oc ca sions are long, ob vi ously 
writ ten by teams of spe cial ists, in deed full with a lot of propa ganda – which can 
eas ily be de tected through ex er cise and by pur su ing a sys tem atic lec ture of these 
docu ments. The en tire pub lic pol icy proc ess and the en tire party rheto ric were 
based on these speeches, by quot ing them re lent lessly and in ces santly in books, 
maga zines, news pa pers, ra dio and TV-pro grams in the years be tween Con gresses 
and Na tional Con fer ences. These are my main rea sons why I based the re search 
for this pa per mainly on them.
The Ro ma nian Com mu nist Lead ers
Face and Mold Pe tro leum
The Ro ma nian com mu nists took power over the eco nomic sec tors of gov ern-
ment in 1945 and their grip on this power was evi dent af ter the na tion ali za tion of 
”the main means of pro duc tion” on June 11th, 1948. How ever, this can not be the 
start ing point of my analy sis due to a very im por tant rea son for which we can not 
ana lyze in de pend ently any sec tor of the Ro ma nian econ omy for al most a dec ade 
af ter the end of World War II, namely the So viet-im posed forms of eco nomic co op-
era tion known as the ”Sov roms”. These were eco nomi cal con glom er ates dedi-
cated ei ther to the pro duc tion of a par ticu lar com mod ity, such as steel or quartz, or 
for a spe cific ac tiv ity of the econ omy, such as trans por ta tion, in which the So viet 
part would usu ally par tici pate with the fi nan cial and fixed capi tal of the for mer 
Ger man so cie ties in Ro ma nia (given to the So viet Un ion af ter the sign ing of the 
1 The main objection with using these sources is their trustworthiness and especially the 
wooden-tongue used in it. Wooden-tongue is not a communist occurrence; any document 
emanating from the European Commission, the United Nations and for that matter the State 
Department is full with wooden-tongue, be it, bureaucratic, universalistic or capitalist. My main 
point is that exercise in reading them provides the patient researcher with the ability to separate 
the precious information from sheer propaganda. Relating to trustworthiness, I tend to think that 
the data provided in the documents researched are reliable in the sense in which we can think 
that we can trust the Communist leaders; if we were simply to conclude that they were lying all 
along, no serious primary-source analysis of Communist regimes is possible, as no independent 
reports existed in closed societies. 
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Armi stice Con ven tion of Sep tem ber 1944) and Ro ma nia would par tici pate with la-
bor, capi tal, and its own eco nomic so cie ties. They were usu ally con trolled by a 
board of di rec tors whose lead ers were over whelm ingly So viet citi zens and whose 
main func tion was to ex ploit and ex port Ro ma nian goods to the So viet Un ion. Not 
sur pris ingly, due to its huge im por tance in the gen eral frame work of the Ro ma nian 
econ omy, pe tro leum was the first prod uct that fell un der the sway of the So vi ets, 
Sov rom petrol be ing the first such com pany, as early as July 17th, 19451. Af ter the na-
tion ali za tion of 1948, all the gov ern ment-owned pe tro leum com pa nies joined Sov-
rom petrol, who by 1950 was con trol ling the en tire crude oil pro duc tion of the 
coun try2. Ac cord ing to David Tur nock, the vir tual na tion ali za tion of the Ro ma nian 
oil in dus try dur ing World War Two (spe cifi cally in 1942) made it quite easy for the 
USSR to cre ate Sov rom petrol and, in his es ti mates, as much as two thirds of the Ro-
ma nian oil pro duc tion was ex ported to the So viet Un ion forth with3. Thus, it is ir-
rele vant for the pur poses of this pa per to ana lyze in depth the speeches and poli cies 
of the Ro ma nian com mu nist lead ers re lated to the oil in dus try of the times: the rele-
vant de ci sions were taken in Mos cow4. Only in the mid-1950’s, when the de ci sion 
to dis solve the Sov roms was taken – usu ally the Ro ma nian gov ern ment hav ing to 
buy-back the So viet share – can my re search truly be gin5.
And so it does, with the speech of Gheor ghe Gheor ghiu-Dej at the sec ond con-
gress of the Ro ma nian’s Work ers Party (RWP) in late 19556. Thus, in De cem ber 
1955, af ter more than 7 years since the pre vi ous con gress, and with the dis so lu tion 
of the Sov roms loom ing, Dej was free to set his own vi sion of in dus trial de vel op-
ment, and he truly did so. Oil in dus try was seen as the en gine of the econ omy, and 
a sig nifi cant num ber of pages was dedi cated to its par ticu lar place. Oil in dus try 
was the first to ful fill the first Five Year Plan (1950-1955), the pro duc tion of crude 
oil be ing 10575 thou sand tons in 1955 (com pared to 6594 thou sand tons in 1938, 
usu ally con sid ered the best year of the pre-com mu nist Ro ma nian econ omy)7. Of 
the to tal in vest ments in in dus try, 28.3% went to oil and gas in dus try, which meant 
by far the larg est in vest ment when com pared to the other sec tors (elec tric power 
re ceived 13.1%, the iron ex trac tion and steel in dus try 10%), thus mak ing oil the 
first branch of in dus try in the mid 1950’s8, de spite huge in vest ments in other sec-
tors, for in stance the met al lur gi cal plants of Hun e do ara or Reşiţa. It was too soon 
1 Florian BANU, Asalt asupra economiei României. De la Solagra la Sovrom (1936-1956), 
Bucureşti, Nemira, 2004, p. 130.
2 Ibidem, p. 151.
3 David TURNOCK, The Romanian Economy in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1986, p. 157.
4 For relevant scholarship considering the commanding position the Soviets had in the 
Romanian Politburo see the classic, or soon to become classic books of Ghiţă IONESCU, Com-
munism in Rumania, 1944-1962, Oxford University Press, London, 1964; Robert LEVY, Ana Pauker. 
The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001; Vladimir 
TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism for All Seasons...cit. 
5 Sovrompetrol, together with Sovromquarţ, was the last disbanded, on October 22nd, 1956, 
Florian BANU, Asalt asupra economiei României...cit., p. 173.
6 This moment also denotes an important shift in the leadership of the party, with Dej 
returning as first secretary after ceding this position to Gheorghe Apostol for more than a year.
7 Gheorghe GHEORGHIU-DEJ, Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the RWP to the 
Second Party Congress, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Bucureşti, 1956. The date of the 
speech is December 23rd, 1955, pp. 47-48.
8 Ibidem, p. 51.
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not to men tion the im por tance of the So viet Un ion in mat ters of de vel op ment in 
the pe tro leum in dus try in the dec ade af ter the Sec ond World War and the es tab lish-
ment of the com mu nist re gime. There fore, Dej makes the ex pected amends, stress-
ing the fact that af ter the 1945-47period, when the capi tal ist oil trusts launched the 
the ory of the fa tal de cline of the Ro ma nian oil pro duc tion by the ex haus tion of oil 
re serves, the help of the USSR through Sov rom petrol meant the dis cov ery of new 
oil fields and thus the re as sur ance that the geo logi cal re serves were much big ger 
than in 1950. There fore, in or der to again ex ceed ing the plan, the com mu nist lead er-
ship stressed rais ing sci en tific knowl edge through So viet train ing, in or der to keep 
the status of oil as the main in dus try in Ro ma nia1. In the next sec tion of the speech, 
dedi cated to the di rec tives con cern ing the re ali za tion of the Sec ond Five-Year Plan, 
Dej men tioned that the in vest ment share in the oil in dus try will still be the high est, 
al though it will de cline to 20.5% of to tal, but will still be huge when com pared to 
the in vest ments in chemi cal in dus try – 13% or iron and steel at 12%2. The first sign 
that con ser va tion and econ omy were im por tant in the gen eral frame work of de vel-
op ment ap pears as early as this speech of 1955 by the pro vi sion that the pe tro leum 
in dus try should con tinue to de velop on the ba sis of an im por tant ex ten sion of ex-
plo ra tion for newer re sources3. This pro vi sion is of para mount im por tance for un-
der stand ing a very im por tant fac tor, which the aca demic canon usu ally ig nores. 
Con ser va tion, the fear for the ex haus tion of re serves, of oil wells, was a per ma-
nent fear for the Ro ma nian com mu nist lead ers, from the very mo ment they got 
their autono mous grip on the lev ers of the na tional econ omy4. Far from be ing care-
less, they al ways men tioned the need for con ser va tion and for the dis cov ery of 
new fields. At a cer tain pe riod, this fear turned into des pera tion and they will try 
to de velop other sources of en ergy – some with a mixed suc cess, like coal or hy-
dro-power plants, other end ing in fail ure, such as nu clear/heavy wa ter plants. 
Dej’s speech is thus im por tant not only be cause some im por tant leit mo tifs ap pear 
in it, but also for what was left out or ig nored in the next speeches of the party lead-
er ship: the cen tral role of the oil in dus try for eco nomic growth. Start ing with the 
next party con gress, oil ceases to be the main branch of in dus try and it be comes 
just a ma jor helper for the de vel op ment of steel or chemi cal in dus try.
The stress on the econ omy and the need for new sources of en ergy for the in-
ten sive de vel op ment of other sec tors of the econ omy be came evi dent from the 
next speeches, even those of Gheor ghiu-Dej. Four and a half years later, at the 
Third Party Con gress, Dej was al ready point ing out to the fact that the con tinu-
ous pro gress of the econ omy is con di tioned by the cor re spond ing growth of the 
en ergy ba sis of the coun try. Thus, he in di cated as main tasks for the fu ture the de-
vel op ment of the lig nite ex trac tion, the im prove ment in the use and in the con ser-
va tion of pe tro leum re sources. This cor re sponded with an other sig nifi cant task, 
1 Ibidem, pp. 53-54.
2 Ibidem, p. 94.
3 Ibidem, p. 102. It became apparent to the Communist leaders as soon as they took back the 
control of the oil reserves that the blood of the economy needs to be controlled tightly if the general 
program of industrial growth and development is to be fulfilled. The correlation between the 
output of energy and the economy’s consumption of energy is obvious to the political leadership 
and will become an leitmotif from now on.
4 One can probably connect that with the quite excessive commitment to oil drilling and 
electrification of the early 1950’s, which took a heavy toll on resources and money, see David 
TURNOCK, The Romanian Economy in the Twentieth Century, cit., p. 162. 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
640 ANDREI MIROIU
re cur rent in all party docu ments, that of the growth of pe tro leum re serves1. How-
ever, the party still had sig nifi cant plans for the de vel op ment of the re fin ing utili-
ties and also for build ing new ca paci ties for ex tract ing and re fin ing pe tro leum in 
lo ca tions such as Brazi, Borzeşti and Telea jen2.
Some how sur pris ingly if we were to take into ac count just the aca demic 
canon, the ar ri val in power of Nico lae Ceauşescu didn’t in crease the stress on pe-
tro leum in dus try in his po liti cal speeches, but in stead rele gated the in dus try, at 
least rhet ori cally, to the mar gins of po liti cal dis course. In his first re port to a party 
con gress in his new ca pac ity of sec re tary-gen eral of the party, on July 19th 1965 
Ceauşescu men tioned just the suc cesses of the chemi cal in dus try in the Third 
Five-Year Plan (who got as a whole one fifth of the to tal al lo ca tions for in dus trial 
de vel op ment), which led to the ef fec tive crea tion of the petro-chemi cal branch of 
the econ omy3. The com mu nist leader al ready stresses the need to dis cover new oil-
fields and the de vel op ment of the coal-ex trac tion in dus try, in or der to in crease the 
pro duc tion of elec tric ity faster than the growth of the en tire econ omy4. How ever, 
this is not en tirely sur pris ing when put ting these sec tions into the gen eral frame-
work of the con gress and the speech. The con gress it self was an op por tu nity for 
Ceauşescu to de velop his own ideo logi cal stance, and his speech is thus merely 
rheto ric and marks his con tinua tion of the na tion al ist line be gun by Dej. Fur ther-
more, he couldn’t and he wouldn’t re port great suc cesses, not be cause they sim ply 
didn’t ex ist, but ac tu ally be cause they would have been at trib uted to his prede ces-
sor, whom the new leader al ready tar geted for sym bolic de nun cia tion. All the re-
sults in the field of oil in dus try so far were ob tained un der Dej and fur ther more 
the short span be tween the death of the for mer party leader and the con gress 
made the clari fi ca tion of po liti cal and ideo logi cal stances far more im pera tive than 
an eco nomic de sign that couldn’t be pre sented as wholly origi nal.
The next party con gress, held in 1969, brought more of the same: a re port 
from the sec re tary gen eral that was still hugely con cerned with po liti cal and ideo-
logi cal is sues rather than the econ omy. In a very scant note, the con ser va tion of oil 
re serves and dis cov ery of new pe tro leum re serves were thought of as ex tremely 
im por tant tasks5, but the re port stops here. How ever, more sig nifi cant for my 
1 Gheorghe GHEORGHIU-DEJ, ”Raportul Comitetului Central (CC) al Partidului 
Muncitoresc Român (PMR) cu privire la activitatea partidului în perioada dintre Congresul al 
II-lea şi Congresul al III-lea al partidului, cu privire la planul de dezvoltare a economiei naţionale 
pe anii 1960-1965 şi la schiţa planului economic de perspectivă pe 15 ani”, in Articole şi cuvântări. 
August 1959-mai 1961, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1961, pp. 116-117.
2 Ibidem, p. 118. See for the development of these particular refineries and oil facilities in the 
general framework of analyzing the pattern of economic development of Romania in the 1960’s 
David TURNOCK, ”The Pattern of Industralization in Romania”, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, vol. 60, no. 3, September 1970, pp. 540-559.
3 Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, ”Raportul CC al PCR cu privire la activitatea partidului în perioada 
dintre Congresul al VIII-lea şi Congresul al IX-lea al PCR”, in Opere alese, vol. I, Ed. Politică, 
Bucureşti, 1982, p. 8. A few things need to be mentioned here for clarity: at the 1965 congress the 
party switched its name from the Romanian Workers Party – which it had from its union with the 
Social Democratic Party in 1948 – back to the Romanian Communist Party and thus it renumbered 
the party Congresses. Thus, the Fourth Congress of the RWP became the Ninth Congress of the 
RCP. Also, the name of the country changed from the People’s Republic of Romania to Socialist 
Republic of Romania and the top leadership position was now designated as secretary-general 
rather than first-secretary of the party.
4 Ibidem, p. 16.
5 Congresul al X-lea al PCR, 6-12 August 1969, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1969, p. 29.
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pur pose are the party di rec tives con cern ing the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan. There, the 
party lead er ship called for main tain ing oil ex trac tion at the 1970 level through out 
the pe riod, at the level of 13.1-13.5 mil lion tons, thus ad mit ting that the re serves 
are lim ited and no new oil fields were ex pected to be opened1. This is the mo ment 
when the party clearly de cided to boost the chemi cal in dus try and to rely on pe tro-
leum re fined prod ucts, by boost ing the pro duc tion by 85-92% in the next five 
years2. In the same time, for the com mu nist lead ers it is ob vi ous that the oil con-
sump tion, which was es sen tially for the pur pose of pro duc ing elec tric ity, was un-
able to keep up with the de mand for en ergy (thus ad mit ting the fail ure to raise the 
pro duc tion of elec tric ity faster than the pace of growth of the econ omy). For the 
first time the need for build ing nu clear power-plants was men tioned, a re cur rent 
theme in sub se quent eco nomic plan ning3. A few years af ter the Tenth Con gress, 
Ceauşescu re it er ated the sub or di nate role of the pe tro leum in dus try as a pil la r of 
eco nomic growth in so cial ist Ro ma nia: the pri ori ties were the mod erni za tion of 
the in dus trial struc ture with an ac cent on pro duc tion of su pe rior steel and the pur-
suit of nu clear en ergy. The stress on the in ten si fi ca tion of geo logi cal re search in or-
der to in crease the vol ume of avail able re serves and for the dis cov ery of new fields 
is al ways pre sent4. This theme, as I said be fore, turned en tirely into an ob ses sion of 
the po liti cal lead er ship, as soon as the oil cri sis be gan. At the Elev enth Party Con-
gress, on 25th No vem ber 1974, the party sec re tary-gen eral Nico lae Ceauşescu was 
mak ing only one men tion of oil in dus try in his en tire re port to the con gress. This 
men tion is the first pro vi sion in his en tire speech de voted to eco nom ics, stress ing 
the need to in ten sify geo logic ac tiv ity in or der to iden tify new en ergy re sources 
and also new raw ma te ri als de pos its (sign that the coal and iron in dus try was also 
go ing through tough times)5.
From this point on the di ver si fi ca tion of the re sources for en ergy pro duc tion 
be comes far more im por tant than any other con sid era tion when re lated to the mat-
ters con cern ing oil. Al ready be fore the main ef fects of the oil cri sis hit the Ro ma-
nian econ omy, its com mu nist lead ers al ready knew they were in trou ble if they 
couldn’t find the nec es sary en ergy re sources to sus tain the rhythm of in dus trial 
growth. In 1977 (thus two years be fore the sec ond oil shock to which most of the 
aca demic canon al ludes to as the turn ing point) Ceauşescu stressed the need for a 
ra tional use of raw ma te ri als and en ergy6. For the oil pro duc tion in par ticu lar, as 
the ex ist ing fields proved that the re serves were more and more lim ited, the lead-
er ship en vi sioned deep and off shore drill ing, still hop ing to find on an in ter nal ba-
sis the nec es sary re sources to fuel up the in dus trial growth7.
More ref er ences to the oil in dus try prob lems are to be found in the docu ments 
of the Twelfth Party Con gress, held from 19 to 23 No vem ber 1979. This is proba bly 
the most fa mous con gress of the en tire Ceauşescu era be cause the only open and 
1 ”Directivele Congresului cu privire la planul cincinal 1971-1975”, in ibidem, pp. 675-676.
2 Ibidem, p. 681.
3 Ibidem, p. 714. One should note the failure of the communist regime in completing its 
nuclear-energy project. The first nuclear reactor was producing electricity for the first time in 
1994, five years after the fall of communism. 
4 Conferinţa naţională a PCR, 19-21 July 1972, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1972, p. 467.
5 ”Raportul CC cu privire la activitatea PCR în perioada dintre Congresul al X-lea şi 
Congresul al XI-lea şi sarcinile de viitor ale partidului”, in Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, Opere alese, 
vol. II, ed. cit., p. 582.
6 Conferinţa naţională a PCR, 7-9 December 1977, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1978, p. 223.
7 Ibidem, p. 388.
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in ter nally-visi ble dis si dence of an eld erly com mu nist leader took place dur ing it, 
namely the speech of for mer party leader Con stan tin Pâr vulescu against the re elec-
tion of Nico lae Ceauşescu as sec re tary-gen eral of the party (his in ter ven tion was 
re moved from the of fi cial col lec tion of docu ments con cern ing the Con gress)1. In 
his re port, the leader of the party ac cen tu ates the need for sav ing en ergy and, ex-
tremely im por tant es pe cially in the dec ade to come, on the use of coal in the pro-
duc tion of elec tric ity and heat ing and on the de vel op ment of hy droe lec tric en ergy 
– and of main tain ing the level of oil ex trac tion at least at the 1980 level2. The cri sis 
con di tions were known and rec og nized by the party lead er ship, who de vised a 
”Di rec tive-pro gram for re search and de vel op ment dur ing the 1981-1990 dec ade” 
which stressed the need, al most the ob ses sion with au tarky evi dent from now on, 
to make Ro ma nia in de pend ent from the point of view of the pro duc tion of en-
ergy3. This pro gram was so am bi tious (and also un re al is tic) that it called for the de-
crease of the per cent age of pe tro leum-pro duced elec tric en ergy from 39.7% in 1980 
to 5 or 4% in 19904. Most rele vant for my dis cus sion here is the evi dence this speech 
brings about the ex tent to which, in the mid dle of the sec ond oil shock, the po liti-
cal lead er ship was com pletely aware of the con se quences of its de ci sions and tried 
eve ry thing in its power to avoid the deep en ing of the prob lems they faced.
This was ex tremely ob vi ous as soon as a dec ade that was marked by the re-
sched ul ing of pay ments and the de ci sion to pay as soon as pos si ble the ex ter nal 
debt started in 1980. On No vem ber 25th 1981, Ceauşescu openly ad mit ted in front 
of the po liti cal and eco nomic lead er ship that there were dif fi cul ties in in sur ing the 
en ergy bases of the econ omy, due largely to the fail ure to ful fill the coal ex trac tion 
and oil-drill ing plans, and also due to ex ces sive con sump tion of en ergy5. The presi-
dent of the re pub lic gives a thor ough as sess ment of the cri sis, dis cuss ing the spe cif-
ics of the [in ter na tional oil?] cri sis and its stronger ef fects on the de vel op ing 
coun tries. In an ideo logi cal twist worth men tion ing here, he calls the prob lems of 
the fi nan cial situa tion – namely the in crease of in ter ests on for eign loans – a new 
form of ”im pe ri al ist and co lo ni al ist op pres sion and ex ploi ta tion cre ated by the fi-
nan cial capi tal”6. It was openly ad mit ted that the ori en ta tion for the pur chase of 
raw ma te ri als and es pe cially en er getic re sources was fo cused out side the CMEA, 
to wards friendly de vel op ing coun tries but also capi tal ist states. More than 80% of 
the pe tro leum im ported came from the LDC’s and es pe cially friendly Arab coun-
tries7. The global im pli ca tions of the en ergy cri sis were fur ther dis cussed at the 
March 31st 1982 party ple nary ses sion, which stressed the need to in crease coal ex-
trac tion, to build elec tric plants based on coal, hy droe lec tric plants and, again, nu-
clear power-plants (who were sup posed to pro vide 14% of the to tal en ergy out put 
1 Constantin Pârvulescu (1895-1992) was briefly member of a triumvirate which led the 
Party in 1944. His speech can be listened at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvvUQz34C3o (last 
visited at October 13, 2009).
2 Congresul al XII-lea al PCR, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1981, pp. 32-34.
3 Ibidem, p. 767.
4 Ibidem, p. 774.
5 ”Expunere la plenara comună a CC al PCR şi a Consiliului Suprem al Dezvoltării 
Economice şi Sociale”, in Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, Opere alese, vol. IV, ed. cit., 1986, p. 217.
6 Ibidem, p. 219. This particular theme will be a recurrent one in the rhetoric of the regime 
and of its press, see for instance the article of Dr Ilie ŞERBĂNESCU, ”Dobânzile excesive – mijloc 
de spoliere neocolonialistă”, Scânteia, 18th March 1986.
7 Ibidem, pp. 232-233.
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by 1990)1. As the year went by, the prob lems be came more and more acute and the 
com mu nist lead ers felt the need to ad dress them in more and more de ter mined 
ways. On De cem ber 16th 1982 Nico lae Ceauşescu was tell ing his fel low lead ers 
that the eco nomic cri sis is worse than the 1929 Great De pres sion. Des per ate meas-
ures were in or der, namely the faster de vel op ment of the en ergy ba sis even by util-
iz ing min er als with a lesser con tent of use ful sub stances. The Party also an nounced 
at that mo ment that it was fully de cided to cut elec tric ity con sump tion2.
One could eas ily fol low the pre oc cu pa tion for the re duc ing of en ergy con sump-
tion and the stress on sav ing and bet ter utili za tion of oil by look ing for in stance at 
cer tain ar ti cles in the main Ro ma nian news pa per, Scânteia (the of fi cial or gan of the 
CC of the RCP). Scânteia was the larg est cir cu lated Ro ma nian news pa per, all in sti tu-
tions were obliged to sub scribed to it and it was where the most of fi cial party line 
was to be found through out the com mu nist dec ades. If there were any changes or 
im por tant mes sages to be sent to the popu la tion, they would be found in this news-
pa per, that largely had the same role as Pravda in the So viet Un ion. I think that a 
look at five con secu tive months in 1984, di rectly pre ceed ing the Thir teenth Party 
Con gress is par ticu larly rele vant. In Janu ary, a front-page ar ti cle by Dan Con stan-
tin with the ti tle ”Mai mult ţiţei, mai multe gaze natu rale” at tempted to mo bi lize 
work ers to ful fill the plan, also em pha siz ing the need to find bet ter ways of ex tract-
ing oil, es pe cially us ing mixed meth ods and deep-drill ing3. The next month, un der 
the ban ner of the re cur ring ru bric ”En er gia elec trică şi com bus ti bilul – rigu ros go-
spo dărite – sever econo misite” a large ar ti cle ap peared ap peal ing on the citi zens 
con science to be came a counter for ra tional con sump tion of en ergy4. The lead ing ar-
ti cle of the March 21st is sue had the ti tle ”În spiri tul in dicaţiilor tovarăşului Nico lae 
Ceauşescu – con su murile en er getice – re duse sub stanţial, la fie care pro dus, în fie-
care în tre prindere”5. The ru bric ”En er gia elec trică şi com bus ti bilul – rigu ros go spo-
dărite – sever econo misite” re ap peared in April with a huge analy sis of de fi cien cies 
in pro duc tion, won der ing how come that the Câm pu lung fac tory was con sum ing 
more en ergy than the Târgu-Jiu fac tory to pro duce the same amount of ce ment6. 
Even more in ter est ing and tell ing is the May 24th num ber, which asked on the sec-
ond page for full aware ness while sav ing en ergy in all branches of in dus try, while 
the first page hosted a huge ma te riel dedi cated to the visit of gen eral Gnassingbe 
Eyadema, the Togo lese dic ta tor (this largely shows who were the friends of Nico-
lae Ceauşescu by that mo ment – dic ta tors from the Third World Coun tries, de void 
of in ter na tional stat ure but pos si bly rich in ma te rial re sources)7.
The same re cur ring themes of con ser va tion, the need to in crease the out put 
of the other en ergy-pro duc ing sec tors of the econ omy came at the time of the 
1 ”Hotărârea plenarei CC al PCR cu privire la realizarea planului de producere a energiei în 
cincinalul 1981-1985 şi dezvoltarea bazei energetice a ţării până în 1990”, in Epoca Nicolae 
Ceauşescu. PCR centrul vital al întregii naţiuni. Documente ale plenarelor CC şi ale Comitetului Politic 
Executiv al CC al PCR 1965-1985, vol. IV, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1986, pp. 61-62.
2 ”Raport cu privire la stadiul actual al edificării socialismului, la realizarea planului unic de 
dezvoltare economico-socială, la programele speciale şi la măsurile pentru îndeplinirea cu succes 
a cincinalului, a hotărârilor Congresului al XII-lea al partidului”, in Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, Opere 
alese, vol. IV, ed. cit., 1986, pp. 395-404.
3 Scânteia, 11 January 1984, no. 12871.
4 Scânteia, 2 February 1984, no. 12890.
5 Scânteia, 21 March 1984, no. 12931.
6 Scânteia, 8 April 1984, no. 12947.
7 Scânteia, 24 May 1984, no. 12985.
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Thirteenth Party Con gress. On No vem ber 19th 1984 the Ro ma nian leader spoke 
about the dire con se quences of the world eco nomic cri sis es pe cially on the pro duc-
tion of oil and pe tro leum-re fined prod ucts. Al though the chemi cal in dus try’s out-
put was by now 39% of the en tire eco nomic pro duc tion, the en ergy re sources needed 
to be boosted by the same much dis cussed means: in crease of the coal out put and 
the de vel op ment of hy dro en er getic pro jects and nu clear en ergy1. A year af ter the 
Con gress, on No vem ber 13th 1985 Nico lae Ceauşescu stressed at the party ple nary 
ses sion that de fi cien cies in the out put of coal led to an in crease in the im port of oil2. 
The com mu nist leader stressed again and again the need to save en ergy; to show 
the dire state of the econ omy, he men tions the need to de velop the rail ways trans por-
ta tion sys tem and to cur tail road-trans por ta tion, which was 10 times more ex pen-
sive3. In 1987 the en ergy cri sis is still out in the open; in March Nico lae Ceauşescu 
was openly ad mit ting that the plan quo tas for the ex trac tion of oil were un ful filled 
and that the most im por tant eco nomic prob lems are caused by the ex ces sive con-
sump tion of en ergy and the fail ure to meet the Five-Year Plan com mit ments4.
The nerv ous ness of the party lead er ship con cern ing the prob lems of the econ-
omy is more and more ob vi ous in the press. Let us take for in stance just the in ter val 
20-25 Sep tem ber 1987. The front edi to rial of Scânteia on Sun day, Sep tem ber 20th 
1987 was signed by Ion Lazăr and was en ti tled ”În întâm pi narea con ferinţei naţion-
ale a par tidu lui. Noile ca pacităţi en er getice – neîntârziat în funcţiune” which 
stressed the need to im ple ment by the end of the year power plants that could pro-
vide a to tal out put of 1700 MW5. On Wednes day, the news pa per hosted a big ar ti cle 
on page two dedi cated to the prepa ra tion of the homes for the cold sea son, ask ing 
citi zens to iso late the win dows and door of their homes to save more en ergy6. Fri-
day, the pa per printed a first page edi to rial by Dr En gi neer Ilie Para schiv on the 
role of sci en tific re search in the proc ess of the de vel op ment of the raw ma te ri als re-
serves and a third page ar ti cle about the prepa ra tion of power-plants for win ter7. 
Thus, one sees very eas ily that mat ters con cern ing the sav ing of en ergy were out 
in the open, not at all a se cret of the com mu nist lead er ship.
The docu ments of the last years of the com mu nist re gime play the same tune 
over and over again. At the 28-29 March 1988 ple nary Ceauşescu states that the ma-
jor prob lems of the econ omy are re lated to the ex ces sive in ter est rates de manded by 
capi tal ist fi nan cial in sti tu tions, which led to a heavy bur den for the de vel op ing 
coun tries8. At the last party con gress, held in No vem ber 1989, the party sec re-
tary-gen eral was again de nounc ing the fi nan cial-bank ing capi tal and su pra na-
tional mo nopo lies as the main form of the ex ploi ta tion of dif fer ent peo ples and 
1 Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, Report of the CC on the Activity of the RCP between the Twelfth Congress 
and the Thirteenth Congress and on the Future Activity of the Party with a View of Attaining Romania`s 
Economic and Social Development Targets under the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan and, in the Long Run, 
until the Year 2000, Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1984, pp. 10-19. 
2 ”Cuvântare la plenara CC al PCR”, in Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, Opere alese, vol. IV, ed. cit., 
1986, p. 846.
3 Ibidem, p. 849.
4 Speech at the 24-25 March 1987 plenary of the CC of the RCP in Munca de partid, vol. 31, 
no. 4, April 1987, p. 3. Munca de partid was the monthly publication of the CC of the RCP.
5 Scânteia, 20 September 1987, no. 14022.
6 Scânteia, 24 September 1987, no. 14024.
7 Scânteia, 25 September 1987, no. 14026.
8 ”Cuvântare la plenara CC al PCR”, Munca de partid, vol. 32, no. 4, April 1988, p. 4.
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es pe cially of the sub or di na tion of de vel op ing coun tries1. The same old themes re ap-
peared, with an em pha sis of the mul ti pli ca tion of the oil re serves, the im prove ment 
of out put in the ex trac tion of coal and the vast de vel op ment of nu clear power-plants 
(the lead er ship en vi sioned that 50% of the elec tric en ergy would come from nu-
clear sources by 1995, in the con text in which Ro ma nia didn’t have a sin gle op era-
tional nu clear re ac tor in 1989)2. On De cem ber 4th, 1989, a des per ate Ro ma nian 
dele ga tion that in cluded Ceauşescu and the prime-min is ter Con stan tin Dăs călescu 
met with Mik hail Gor ba chev and the So viet pre mier Ni ko lai Ryzhkov in Moskow, 
a day af ter the fa mous Malta sum mit be tween Gor ba chev and George H.W. Bush. 
The Ro ma nian leader made a self criti cism for not lis ten ing to Brezhnev in the 
1970’s and go ing into debt and let the prime-min is ter to beg for bi lat eral eco nomic 
talks re gard ing the im port of en ergy and raw goods from the So viet Un ion3. On De-
cem ber 16th, 1989, five days be fore the fall of the re gime, and on the day when the 
re pres sion against the pro test ers in Timişoara be gan, Nico lae Mili taru pub lished a 
front-page edi to rial in Scânteia call ing for the broad en ing of the en ergy and raw-ma-
te ri als ba sis of the coun try as pri or ity ob jec tives of the en tire eco nomic ac tiv ity4. 
The re gime was in deed dy ing with the en ergy is sues hang ing from its neck.
In ter pre ta tion and Con clu sion
What are the gen eral con clu sions of my re search? How can we look at the aca-
demic canon in the light of the pri mary-sources re search pre sented above? As I 
men tioned ear lier, the pur pose of this par ticu lar pa per was not to re fute or to dras-
ti cally amend the aca demic canon. In deed, a re search pro ject bent on re fut ing the 
canon would be more fo cused on the ac tual proc esses in side the econ omy, to look 
for trends in the na tional budget, prices, trends in pub lic debt, in vest ment in the in-
dus try, and the eco nomic in ter con nec tions be tween the pe tro leum in dus try and 
the econ omy as a whole, as well as ex ter nal forces. Such work would im ply a re-
search into his tori cal pub lic poli cies and eco nom ics. The pur pose of my pa per in-
stead were first to es tab lish and dis cuss the ex is tence of the aca demic canon and 
sec ondly to see whether the re search of the pub lic speeches of the Ro ma nian com-
mu nist lead er ship can shed any sup ple men tary light re gard ing the es tab lished 
the ory. From my point of view, the re search that I pur sued in this pa per of fers 
some im por tant de vel op ments and amend ments to the canon.
First, it points out to the fact that – at least for the stated pol icy – the oil in dus-
try was not the main con cern of the com mu nist re gime start ing at least in the early 
1 Nicolae CEAUŞESCU, ”Raport cu privire la stadiul actual al societăţii socialiste româneşti, 
la activitatea CC între Congresele al XIII-lea şi al XIV-lea, la realizarea Programului-Directivă de 
dezvoltare economico-socială în cincinalul al IX-lea şi în perspectivă până în anii 2000-2010, 
în vederea îndeplinirii neabătute a Programului de făurire a societăţii socialiste multilateral 
dezvoltate şi înaintare a României spre comunism”, Munca de partid, vol. 33, no. 12, December 
1989, p. 44.
2 Ibidem, p. 21.
3 ”Minutes of the Meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Moscow”, 
December 4th, 1989 available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/cwihp/documentreaders/eotcw/
891204b.pdf (last visited at December 1st, 2008).
4 Scânteia, 17 December 1989, no. 14722.
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1960`s. Ex cept for a short pe riod im me di ately fol low ing the re cu pera tion of sov er-
eignty re lated to oil pol icy in the mid 1950’s, the pe tro leum in dus try was never an 
end in it self for the Ro ma nian com mu nists. A closer look to their grasp of the in dus-
trial de vel op ment of Ro ma nia shows, in my opin ion, that oil was just one very im-
por tant means to fire up the gen eral in dus trial de vel op ment of the coun try, whose 
ac cent ac tu ally lies more on more on met al lurgy, the con struc tion of heavy and ad-
vanced ma chin ery, and chemi cal prod ucts. En ergy was just blood in the veins of 
the econ omy, not a pur pose in it self. I think that the idea that Ceauşescu wanted 
only to build a strong pet ro chemi cal in dus try is an over state ment; the de vel op-
ment of the econ omy was far more com plex in the mind of the com mu nist lead ers.
Sec ondly, the prob lems with the sup ply of en ergy didn’t start with the oil cri-
ses of the 1970s, but were merely ag gra vated by them. Ro ma nia was grow ing 
faster from an in dus trial point of view than its abil ity to pro vide enough en ergy to 
all its in dus try plus its boom ing ur ban popu la tion. Oil was just one of the ways to 
pro vide en ergy to the econ omy, as al ways since the 1960’s the stress was on de vel-
op ing other sources such as coal, hy dro-en ergy and nu clear en ergy. The fail ure of 
the pro jects re lated to these three, plus the de cline of the pro duc tion of pe tro leum 
AND the oil cri sis led to the gen eral in dus trial cri sis of the 1980`s, in con junc tion 
with Ro ma nia`s shaky base of raw ma te ri als.
Third, the re search pointed out that the com mu nist lead er ship and af ter a cer-
tain mo ment the gen eral pub lic was deeply aware of the prob lems of the struc tur-
ing of the econ omy, be cause all those prob lems were ex posed in pub lic broad casts, 
speeches and ar ti cles pub lished in the main stream press. The Ro ma nian lead ers 
did not keep the cri sis in the dark, but rather they dis cussed it out in the open, 
even though they were blam ing the for eign banks and in dus trial mo nopo lies for 
it, leav ing only small ref er ences to the in abil ity of the work force and the ma chin-
ery to ful fill the yearly or five-year plans. The de ci sion for au tarky was not a per-
ma nent char ac ter is tic of the com mu nist re gime. In deed, this pre limi nary re search 
leads to an idea that needs fur ther work, namely that the re gime wanted at least 
ini tially to con nect Ro ma nia with in ter na tional trade and de velop it as a net ex-
porter of ad vanced in dus trial prod ucts, us ing the heavy cur rency ob tained from 
trad ing re fined pe tro leum prod ucts for buy ing newer tech nolo gies.
The gen eral con clu sion of the pa per is that a deeper re search on the party docu-
ments and eco nomic poli cies lead to a wider un der stand ing not only of the world-
view of the Ro ma nian com mu nist lead ers, but also to nu ances when de scrib ing the 
eco nomic causes of po liti cal and so cial change. If some how dull and un re ward ing 
at first, af ter a cer tain mas tery of elimi nat ing the wooden-tongue pas sages, these 
docu ments can be come deeply rele vant for un der stand ing a cer tain com mu nist re-
gime. This re search pro ject re in forced my view that good re search must not be con-
fined to a par ticu lar event or even time pe riod; a me dium, if not a longue du rée is a 
far bet ter meth odo logi cal ap proach.
